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The case next called for argument before the high tribunal
held little promise of posing any issues of general legal interest.
The extent of Florida's power to tax the rolling stock of a traveling
circus whose home base was in the citrus commonwealth did not
appear to be at the cutting edge of contemporary constitutional law.
The puzzle, indeed, was why so pedestrian a case was entitled to
a claim on that scarcest of public resources-plenary consideration
by the Justices. Nonetheless, as the argument got under way, it
soon became apparent that this controversy of modest scope was
taking on more substantial moment-not an earth-shaking case, to
be sure, but no longer a wholly mundane one. In part, this was
a function of the careful presentations of counsel. But in greater
part it was a function of the contributions emanating from the
bench-questions that directly illuminated the immediate area in
controversy and also cast a reflected and reflective light on more
remote parts of the legal terrain.
The high tribunal lived up to its highest traditions. And no
less would have been expected of the formidable three-judge panel
that constituted the University of Pennsylvania Law School's Keedy
Cup Court at the 1980 Term: In the center chair was the Chief
Justice of the United States. Flanking him were two friends and
long-time comrades in the cause of judicial reform: On the Chief
Justice's right was Samuel J. Roberts, Associate Justice of the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, for nearly two decades one of the leading
state court judges in the United States. On the Chief Justice's left
was Bernard G. Segal, for a generation the lead counsel in almost
every significant campaign to raise the standards and horizons of
the bar and bench of the nation.'
ii.
A few years before, the Chief Justice, from the vantage point
of his own accustomed center chair in his own Court, had judged
f District Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania. A.B. 1943, Harvard University; LL.B. 1948, Yale University.
I The Chief Justice's willingness to add the duties of Chief Justice of the Keedy
Cup Court to his regular Article HI duties stemmed from his generous interest in
doing honor to Justice Roberts and Mr. Segal in the fiftieth year of their graduation
from the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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Mr. Segal, standing at his accustomed place at the bar of the Court,
to be unique. But, when the Chief Justice announced that judg-
ment, Mr. Segal was, for the first time in his entire career, at a loss
for words.
It turned out that Mr. Segal's perceived uniqueness that day
inhered in what was understood to be the unprecedented role be-
ing played, in the United States Supreme Court, by Mr. Segal's
venerable client. Mr. Segal's client was the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. And the Highest Court of the Commonwealth was appear-
ing, through Mr. Segal, as amicus to its chronologically very junior,
if hierarchically somewhat senior, judicial sibling, the Highest
Court of the Land.
2
But uniqueness is not much of a novelty for Mr. Segal. He
has spent most of his lawyerly life doing well things that other
lawyers have done inadequately or not at all. He has been equally
at home devising and carrying out new strategies, building new
institutions, and adapting old institutions to new purposes.
i..
Standard appraisals of Mr. Segal's seemingly endless curricu-
lum vitae tend to give greatest weight to two entries-Mr. Segal's
Presidency of the American Bar Association and his founding of
the ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary. Mr.
2 The case in which Mr. Segal found himself speaking on one august court's
behalf to an even more august court was Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119 (1977),
reviewing the determination of a three-judge district court that certain aspects of
Pennsylvania's nonjudicial procedures for the commitment of minors to state mental
institutions did not comport with due process standards. This determination, to the
extent that its interim implementation appeared to contemplate, and indeed to direct,
a substantial enlargement of the adjudicatory burdens of the Court of Common Pleas,
was a matter of serious administrative concern to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The delicacy of the role of an advocate who represents a court acting in its admin-
istrative capacity is reflected in the following excerpt from Law Week's summary of
the oral argument:
Mr. Justice White asked Segal if the lower federal court was correct
on the due process issue. Segal answered that while he personally believed
the due process point was wrongly decided, he could not speak to this issue
for the party he represented, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
45 U.S.L.W. 3406 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
It would appear from the action of the United States Supreme Court in remand-
ing the case to the district court to review the impact of supervening state legislation
that Mr. Segal's advocacy was effective, once he reached the lectern. But getting to
the lectern was no easy matter. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's first application
to be an amicus in Kremens v. Bartley was rebuffed. 426 U.S. 945 (1976). On
reconsideration, leave to file a brief was granted. 429 U.S. 882 (1976). On further
consideration, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was permitted to participate, through
Mr. Segal, in the oral argument (but by reallocating the existing time for argument,
not by enlarging the time). Id. 957. Tenacity-as Mr. Segal has so often demon-
strated-is a major ingredient of lawyerly success.
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Segal's term as ABA President was significant-perhaps more so
than any other ABA presidential term in half a century-because
Mr. Segal used it to rally American lawyers to a renewed sense of
the public responsibilities of their profession. The work of the
Committee on the Federal Judiciary has been of substantial conse-
quence in impressing on presidents, attorneys general, and senators
that the demanding responsibilities of the federal judiciary cannot
be carried out by men and women of indifferent professional quali-
fications. In large measure, the generally high quality of the hun-
dreds of federal judges appointed by Presidents Eisenhower, Ken-
nedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter is traceable to the
systematic monitoring of candidates for federal judicial office con-
ducted by Mr. Segal and the other lawyers who have borne the
thankless burden of the Committee's work for nearly thirty years.
Mr. Segal has been widely praised for these twin achievements,
and properly so. But I think equal time is owed-and equal tribute
should be paid-to two other Segalian endeavors that, perhaps for
the very reason that they were outside the framework of the ABA,
have been somewhat less celebrated, but that, nonetheless, have
served the law's vital purposes in the same way and with equal
success.
At the urging of President Kennedy, Mr. Segal, in collaboration
with the late Harrison Tweed, founded the Lawyers' Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law.3 Created at a time when the ABA
itself did not yet fully understand the constitutional imperative of
equal protection of the laws, the Lawyers' Committee gave to the
civil rights movement the favoring imprimatur of the establishment
bar. Not only in the rural South, but in the urban North as well,
the Lawyers' Committee gave practical impetus to the ideal of able
legal representation for people too poor and causes too powerless
to command the services of good lawyers at market prices. The
Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia and offices like it across
the country are part of the indelible heritage of professional re-
sponsibility that Mr. Segal and his colleagues of the Lawyers' Com-
mittee bequeathed to the American bar.
A decade before he founded the Lawyers' Committee, Mr.
Segal played a critical role in winning one of the most important
battles fought in this century for the integrity of the federal judi-
3 In his contribution to this dedication, Judge Adams also discusses Mr. Segal's
role in the founding of the Lawyers' Committee. From Judge Adams's account, it
is apparent that Mr. Segal was not only the architect and master builder of the
Lawyers' Committee, but was also the first person to conceive its necessity, pro-
posing the idea to then Attorney General Robert Kennedy and thereby to the
President. See Adams, Bernard G. Segal, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1023, 1027 (1981).
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ciary. In 1950, at the behest of Chief Judge Biggs, Mr. Segal went
to Washington to pry out of the Senate Judiciary Committee Presi-
dent Truman's stalled nomination to the Third Circuit of William
Hastie-the eminent lawyer-scholar-public servant who was the first
black ever named to an Article III judgeship. But for Mr. Segal's
efforts, it is possible that one of the finest judges of our time would
never have won Senate confirmation.
iv.
Meetings of the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School take place in the Bernard G. Segal Moot Court Room, under
Mr. Segal's portrait's watchful eye. Mr. Segal, L-'31, has been in
and of his Law School-first as brilliant student, and thereafter as
adjunct faculty member, as Overseer, as Life Trustee, and as
fiercely protective and benevolent alumnus-for half a century.
There was a time long ago-back before recorded history was
decently under way-when Bernard Segal had not yet invented law.
As a college undergraduate, he had not yet been beguiled by the
acronymic mysteries of ABA, ALI, USCA and USLW. He and his
college classmates-for example, Samuel J. Roberts, q.v., and Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr. (who was to go on to Another Law School)-
were as yet uncorrupted by Restatements and Restitution.
But even in that state of innocence, the green that under-
graduate Segal and his friends gamboled on was the campus of the
University of Pennsylvania. The University was Bernard Segal's
primordial turf. And he has continued to exercise suzerainty over
the entire domain-not just the Law School-throughout his long
and devoted tenure as Trustee.
Heretical though it sounds, there is a real possibility that
Bernard Segal's Law School, deeply as he cherishes it, means no
more to him than his Faculty of Arts and Sciences, that most re-
cently established academic structure which is, properly, the heart of
the University. Lawyer Segal recognizes the intellectual primacy
of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences because he knows that leges sine
moribus vanae. But his recognition has other and even stronger
roots: Just a few years ago, that Faculty's Department of Sociology
conferred its doctorate on Geraldine Segal. And, more recently
still, Bernard Segal celebrated the two ruling passions of his life-
Dr. Segal and his University-by establishing the Geraldine R. Segal
Professorship of American Social Thought.
And this is why Lawyer Segal is, and deserves to be, a prophet
in his own country.
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